JNS
“If, after Oct. 7, and after seeing the implications of military buildup, we don't insist on this, then it essentially means Israel can be forced to fold on any issue.”
Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu, visibly frustrated and at times even rightfully furious, addressed a hostile foreign press Wednesday evening, condemning defeatist elements who advocate for Israel’s withdrawal from the Philadelphi Corridor—a move demanded by Hamas, the international community, some of the prominent leftist representatives in Israel’s political and defense establishments, and a minority of Israeli civilians.
Clearly under pressure from the international community to leave the corridor, Netanyahu warned repeatedly during the press conference that such a retreat would enable Hamas to maintain power and smuggle in weapons, preventing the demilitarization of Gaza and posing a grave threat to Israel’s security.
National Unity Party leader Benny Gantz and Knesset member Gadi Eisenkot held their own press conference on Tuesday evening, accusing Netanyahu of obstructing a potential hostage deal with Hamas. They also disputed his stance that Israel should maintain control of the Philadelphi Corridor.
But many Israelis believe this type of thinking is misguided and part of the failed “conceptzia” (governing assumptions) that preceded the Oct. 7 attacks.
As Gallant, Gantz and Eisenkot, as well as opposition leader Yair Lapid, have demonstrated in recent days, they and other high-ranking political and military figures still hold on to these defeatist views.
According to Enia Krivine, senior director for the Foundation for Defense of Democracies’ Israel Programs and National Security Network, “Since day one of the war there has been tension between two of the primary war goals—to bring the hostages back and dismantle Hamas.”
Some in Israel's political and military echelon, said Krivine, "have decided that bringing the hostages home alive has become the paramount war goal and that this moral imperative supersedes the other two goals,” she said.
Thousands of Israelis siding with this view are currently demonstrating against Netanyahu, accusing him of obstructing a hostage deal.
Netanyahu has been criticized by Israelis on the right for not entering Rafah sooner and taking control of the Philadelphi Corridor immediately after the initial military invasion of Gaza on Oct. 27.
Now that Israeli forces are there, Israelis on the left want Netanyahu to withdraw them to facilitate a deal to get more hostages released.
But many experts, including Krivine and former Israeli National Security Adviser Meir Ben-Shabbat, agree with Netanyahu that contrary to what some Israeli defense officials believe, Israel will not be able to easily return to the corridor once it withdraws, as the international community will place heavy pressure on Jerusalem to keep it from doing so.
“There are those who believe that we can temporarily relinquish control—for 42 days—until the first phase of the deal is completed, and then, if the deal does not progress, return and regain control of the area,” said Ben-Shabbat.
“Of course, the IDF has the ability, operationally, [to] reoccupy this corridor even after 42 days, but it’s not just a matter of military capability,” he added. “Everyone understands that once we leave, Israel will face immense diplomatic pressure from the U.S. and other countries not to return.”
Ben-Shabbat warned that since we are in the final stretch before the U.S. elections, the expected American pressure “will be extremely heavy.”
“The legitimacy Israel had to occupy this corridor following Oct. 7 will not exist after we leave it,” he said.
Krivine agreed, saying Israel “would [not] have the legitimacy or the support necessary to accomplish this; not from the United States, not from Egypt and not from the international community.”
Part of the reason for Israel’s insistence, she told JNS, is because the third primary goal of the war is “to make sure that Hamas can no longer pose a threat to Israel.”
Part of the confusion leading up to the press conference was that Netanyahu seems to now be saying he does not intend to withdraw from the Philadelphi Corridor, but media outlets had reported that he had agreed to withdraw from parts of the corridor that are heavily populated, in the second phase of a proposed ceasefire deal.
Netanyahu clarified on Wednesday that Israel would be willing to withdraw if a suitable foreign entity is found that is able to properly monitor the border and prevent smuggling there.
It is worth mentioning that the European Union Border Assistance Mission (EUBAM) was supposed to monitor the Rafah border after Israel’s disengagement from Gaza, but in 2007, after Hamas took over, EUBAM officials simply ran away, fearing for their own security.
Israel is not interested in, nor can it afford, a repeat of such a scenario.
The Philadelphi Corridor was problematic from the very beginning
When Israel pulled out of Gaza in 2005, then-U.S. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice overrode strong Israeli objections to giving up control over the Philadelphi Corridor.
Israel knew that without effective control of this strip of land, it would become a conduit for smuggling weapons into Gaza. But heavy pressure from the Bush administration, and Rice specifically, forced Israel to pull its forces from the area.
Rice urged Israel to vacate the corridor as a “peaceful gesture” to the Palestinians. Unfortunately, Israel’s leader at the time, Ariel Sharon, caved to this dangerous request.
While today Egypt denies it has allowed the smuggling of weapons into Gaza, we know this is not true.
Already in 2008, Rice said Cairo must improve border patrol efforts after Israeli officials complained that Egypt was doing a “terrible” job on the Gaza border, failing to stop smuggling of weapons and ammunition into Gaza through tunnels under the Philadelphi Corridor.
“We think that Egypt has to do more. Those tunnels need to be dealt with,” Rice said at the time.
Israeli officials said they had sent a video to Washington showing Egyptian security forces helping Hamas terrorists smuggle arms across the border into Gaza.
Egypt responded that it was “doing its best” with the number of personnel it was allowed to deploy at the border under the 1979 peace treaty and a subsequent agreement with Israel.
When Egyptian President Abdel Fattah al-Sisi came to power in 2013, he allegedly moved to destroy many of the tunnels.
But having uncovered and blocked off 150 smuggling tunnels so far in just the past few months, the IDF has proven that Egypt cannot be trusted and Israel cannot again leave the corridor since Hamas, or other terror organizations, will swiftly return to building new ones.
That decision by the Americans—the type of thinking that continues to pervade the U.S. State Department through the present day—directly led to the tragic events of Oct. 7, the ensuing war over these last 11 months and the continuing tragedy of the hostages in Gaza.
This thinking is the reason Israel was forced to pause fighting for three months earlier in the war, was behind the American pressure on Israel not to enter Rafah and is the leading reason the Americans insist the war “must end now.”
Demonstrating more common sense, Israel’s Security Cabinet voted last Thursday night in favor of maintaining a continued IDF presence in the corridor, even at the cost of a hostage deal.
Israeli Defense Minister Yoav Gallant voted against the decision, while National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir abstained.
Following news of the execution by Hamas of six hostages, whose bodies were found on Saturday in a Rafah tunnel, Gallant on Sunday called for the Cabinet to reverse its decision, claiming that the corridor is one of the biggest obstacles to a ceasefire deal.
U.S. President Joe Biden expressed his shock and anger over the hostages' murders and said Hamas leaders must be held accountable.
However, when asked if he felt Netanyahu had done enough to get the hostages released, Biden said “no.”
During a local press conference on Monday, Netanyahu dismissed reports that Biden had criticized him for not doing enough to secure a ceasefire deal, saying he “does not believe Biden said that” in light of the murders.
“What message does this send Hamas?” said Netanyahu.
“I don’t believe that either President Biden or anyone else serious about achieving peace and achieving [the hostages'] release would seriously ask Israel to make these concessions. We’ve already made them. Hamas has to make the concessions,” he added.
What if Israel withdraws?
Ben-Shabbat told JNS that relinquishing control of the Philadelphi Corridor “would encourage Hamas, signal to the residents of Gaza that the terror organization will continue to be the dominant force in the Strip and might even embolden the 'resistance axis,' particularly Hezbollah, to take a harder stance against Israel.”
He added: “If, after Oct. 7, and after seeing the implications of military buildup, we don't insist on this, then it essentially means Israel can be forced to fold on any issue.”
Ben-Shabbat went on to say that “past experience does not allow us to rely on the goodwill of others, especially after what happened to us on Oct. 7.”
He recalled what happened in January 2009 on the eve of the conclusion of "Operation Cast Lead," when then-Israeli Foreign Minister Tzipi Livni signed an agreement with the United States and NATO for joint efforts to counter the smuggling threat.
“This agreement did not prevent even a gram of gunpowder from being smuggled into Gaza,” he said.
While some argue that it’s not wise to occupy the corridor because it’s a narrow strip of land, and staying there would expose Israeli forces, Ben-Shabbat told JNS that “now is precisely the time for the IDF to carry out all the necessary engineering work in the area to improve conditions for the safety of our forces,” adding, “Who said we have to settle for a 14-meter-wide strip?”
Ensuring the security of Israeli forces “justifies making the necessary changes to the terrain, and the width of the corridor should be determined accordingly,” he said.
In Krivine’s view, Israel may eventually be able to allow the Egyptians or Americans physical control of the corridor, but it would be irresponsible to do so today.
“There is no way to prevent arms getting in—or terrorists and potentially hostages—being smuggled out of the enclave without a credible inspections regime in the corridor both below ground and above ground,” she said. “Until there is a credible inspections regime established that deprives Hamas the ability to rearm, the Philadelphi corridor must remain in the hands of the IDF.”
[Hamas leader] Yahya Sinwar “understands that the hostages are his only remaining leverage over the government of Israel,” she said, adding that Sinwar’s “wicked decision” to execute the hostages when IDF forces were so close to rescuing them “was a ploy to create a wedge in Israeli society and pressure Netanyahu into making tough concessions at the negotiating table.”
Sinwar, she said, "knows that Israel’s Achilles heel is its deep valuing of human life, and he understands how to drive a stake into the heart of Israeli society.”
According to Krivine, giving in to Hamas’s demands means that the terror group survives and begins the process of rebuilding.
“There is no third party—not the P.A. and not the moderate Arab states—that will step into the void unless the IDF can ensure that Hamas is unable to regroup and rearm,” she said.
Israel’s path forward
Brian Carter of the American Enterprise Institute seems to agree.
He told JNS that “either Israel or another capable entity must control the Philadelphi Corridor for Israel to prevent Hamas from rebuilding its capabilities to the same level the group reached by Oct. 7.”
Otherwise, he warned, “Hamas will gradually rebuild itself and undo the progress Israel has made toward defeating the group.”
Any outcome that results in a rebuilt Hamas is "unacceptable and would constitute an Israeli defeat,” he said.
According to Carter, the way forward is to find a party that is capable of and willing to control the Philadelphi Corridor.
He believes it is “unlikely” that any force could prevent smuggling under the corridor without a presence on the corridor.
Ben-Shabbat told JNS that Israel can take more steps to ensure it achieves its objectives in this war.
First, Israel must “completely deprive Hamas of control over the supplies entering the Strip,” he said. “This is its lifeline and the main means of maintaining its governance.”
Second, Israel should “divide Gaza into more sections, beyond what currently exists.”
Third, as another former head of the Israeli National Security Council, Giora Eiland, proposed, Israel should launch a “broad operation” in northern Gaza. This means evacuating Gaza City and the northern Strip, closing it off as a military zone, cutting off supplies to the area, and then conducting a thorough military operation to destroy terrorists.
“In my opinion, it is a good option,” Ben-Shabbat told JNS.
“The plan does have its drawbacks though as Israel can expect resistance from the United States and the international community, and the fact that it involves returning many IDF forces to the Gaza Strip,” he noted.
Finally, Ben-Shabbat suggested Israel could “take action” against Hamas leaders abroad.
