JNS
"I did not fulfill the mission as I expected of myself, nor as my subordinates, superiors and the citizens of Israel expected of me," Brig. Gen. Yossi Sariel wrote.
The commander of the Israel Defense Forces' Unit 8200 intelligence branch—the equivalent of the U.S. National Security Agency—has submitted his resignation over the military's failure to prevent Hamas's Oct. 7 cross-border invasion, the IDF announced on Thursday.
Brig. Gen. Yossi Sariel, the second senior intelligence officer to resign since Oct. 7, will be replaced "in the coming period," the army said.
In his resignation letter, the commander wrote, "On October 7, I did not fulfill the mission as I expected of myself, nor as my subordinates, superiors and the citizens of Israel expected of me.
"I am seeking to fulfill my personal responsibility as the commander of the unit, and at a time determined by my superiors, I will pass the baton to the next in line," Sariel said.
Unit 8200, the IDF's signal intelligence unit, is considered the "eyes of Israel" and is part of the Military Intelligence Directorate, known in Hebrew by the acronym AMAN. The unit is responsible for some 80% of the information gathered and produced for all intelligence branches.
Five months ago, AMAN head Maj. Gen. Aharon Haliva, who served in the military for almost four decades, asked IDF Chief of Staff Lt. Gen. Herzi Halevi to relieve him of his duties following the conclusion of an internal probe and after an "orderly learning and transition process." Haliva stepped down and retired from active service on Aug. 21.
Sariel last year reportedly refused to take any blame for the failures, saying his team provided all the necessary intelligence. In May, his unit promoted two of its officers, drawing criticism from within the army.
Israel's Channel 12 News reported in June that critical computer systems used by Unit 8200 broke down on Oct. 6 and were only repaired some 90 minutes before Hamas launched its cross-border terrorist massacre.
The report, which revealed limited information on the alleged computer failure due to IDF military censorship rules, claimed the systems only came fully back online after the attack was underway.
A former intelligence official told the broadcaster that "if the system had been working at those hours, it is very likely that dramatic information would have arrived that would have changed the intelligence picture."
Also in June, a three-member audit team from the IDF's General Staff infiltrated the Unit 8200 base at the Glilot military camp in Ramat Hasharon, north of Tel Aviv. The three posed as officers and entered directly through the guard house without being challenged.
"For nearly three hours, they roamed the base unhindered, reached operational compounds, collected hundreds of classified documents and data material from secret computers," according to a Ynet report.
If the three had been enemies, they could have caused severe damage to the base's infrastructure, soldiers and staff in what would have constituted a huge blow to the IDF and Israel, the news site noted.
