By Yisrael Medad, JNS
No one—from the prime minister (and former prime ministers) to commanders in the Israel Defense Forces—should be immune.
The former head of the Mossad, Uzi Arad, was very critical of Benjamin Netanyahu in an Oct. 4 interview with Shira Rubin of The Washington Post. Netanyahu, he said, “championed a radical reconceptualization of Israel’s approach to Hamas.” It was a strategy of “containment that relied on shoring up the group’s government in Gaza with financial support from intermediaries while keeping its military capabilities in check with occasional bombing campaigns.” Arad, however, is of the opinion that “it was self-delusion. And there wasn’t anyone who challenged it.”
Conceptualizations have been the bane of Israel’s security failures before, most notably regarding the 1973 Yom Kippur War. That debacle, at least, was one in which the government was convinced a full day earlier that war would break out, unlike Netanyahu’s cabinet. Whereas Israeli premier Golda Meir and her ministers decided not to act preemptively on the information available to them and based on army intelligence, Netanyahu was not even woken up to digest the incoming reports or given a chance to make a wrong—or correct—decision until 6:29 a.m. on the day Hamas crossed the border.
Journalistic investigations into the debacle of the performance of the Israel Defense Forces leading up to Oct. 7, including lack of reinforced shelters and arms training, as well as the near-total collapse of any effective organized defense action until well after midday by the IDF, make for painful reading. Even if Israel’s governments preferred to simply contain Hamas—and worse, allowing themselves to be convinced that Hamas was deterred—it is the army’s responsibility, at the very least, to be prepared to confront attacks.
No one in the IDF, in the Mossad, in the GSS thought to alert the prime minister of a possible dangerous development in Israel’s south. Even Maj. Gen Aharon Haliva, now retired, the former commander of the IDF’s Military Intelligence Directorate, slept through the night while other commanders discussed and debated the situation.
The most senior commanders, in the two previous years, had either ignored or suppressed indications of a change in Hamas strategy from the field spotters. Herzi Halevi, appointed as IDF Chief of Staff by Benny Gantz (over protests that were ignored by the State Attorney General, appointed by Gantz’s government on the recommendation of Gideon Sa’ar) was previously the commander of the Israeli Southern Command, responsible for Gaza, and before that, the chief of the Military Intelligence Directorate. It would appear that the IDF’s role in the debacle is not incidental. One decision was to remove rifles from the members of the emergency intervention teams of the communities. Another was to close the Open Source Intelligence unit and merge it, making it less effective.
The army, however, was only part of the problem of a wrong and misguided conceptualization. The political echelons over the years contributed to the willingness of the senior command to dismiss or minimize the threat that Hamas represented.
The idea—the belief that peace is obtainable by convincing the Arabs that Israel is willing to compromise—only fed their convictions that the Zionist entity is weak. Ever since the Oslo Accords, and even previously, territorial surrender combined with a strengthening of the military capabilities of the Arab terror groups, mainly via Iran, undermined Israel’s strategic security. It needs be acknowledged that between Gaza and Iran, Israel’s governments viewed the threat of a nuclear enemy as one that demanded the most attention.
It is another matter if Netanyahu had ordered the army these past few years to operate in a much more aggressive manner and if those opposing his policies would have applauded that approach. For example, what has occurred in Judea and Samaria—the elimination of more than 600 mainly Hamas terrorists over the past year, including drone strikes and aerial bombings—would have been unacceptable if not for the Oct. 7 invasion.
An unexpected voice highlighting a different approach to responsibility is that of Aviad Bachar. A resident of Kibbutz Be’eri, he lost his wife and son Carmel. They were killed in their safe room during the overrunning of the kibbutz. His right leg required amputation. The kibbutz belongs to the historic Mapai stream—founded in 1946 as one of the “11 points in the Negev”—and was a center of Habonim settlement training. An island of socialism.
Touching on the responsibility of a political conceptualization that weakened, perhaps, security planning, back in February, he said, “Migration is a solution. The State of Israel must encourage emigration. … Physically expel them, so that there will not be one there.”
Interviewed recently on Israel’s Channel 12, he added, “Those who live on the other side there, they don’t talk to you about life, and you can’t negotiate with them about people, only land. They understand land. By the way, they didn’t kill us because of our Jewishness, and massacred us with unbearable brutality, because they simply wanted this land.”
He is not the only one to reconsider their ideological positions and the responsibility of those positions for what led to Oct. 7. In Haaretz, you could read this headline in February: “ ‘Settlers Are Right’: The Kibbutz Movement Should Break Away From the Left, Outgoing Leader Says.” Well-known chef Meir Adoni announced that he was that he was “ashamed that he was part of the delusion of the delusional left who don’t understand that we are surrounded by extreme Islam monsters who have no interest in peace and normalcy, and only want to burn us alive.” He even asked forgiveness for having identified as left-wing.
Another peace activist, Yael Noy, who heads Roads to Recovery—the group that drove Gazans into Israel for hospital treatment—while refusing to yield on the need for the continuation of such volunteering, admits: “Even people on the left say that we should flatten Gaza. Both sides have become more and more radicalized.” While a minority still, there is no doubt many left-wingers are less comfortable in their ideologies than previously.
Returning to the IDF’s responsibility, there is a need to reflect on two post-Oct. 7 events: the promotions of senior officers who were involved in the failures, such as Shlomi Binder; as well as the removal of officers supposedly considered “too assertive” and too identified with rightist, nationalist outlooks, like Ofer Winter and Yaniv Asor. Asor had urged a stricter attitude towards the reservists and volunteers promoting the campaign of the Brothers in Arms group to refuse to serve. That campaign is widely believed to have encouraged Hamas in its decision to attack, seeing it as a weakening and a collapse of Israel society.
There is much to be investigated. It must be a broad and deep process. No one—from the prime minister (and former prime ministers) to IDF commanders—should be immune. But it must be done to identify not only who failed but how to be victorious in the future.
